South Carolina Law Review
Volume 55
Issue 3 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW

Article 6

Spring 2004

Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson: Class Action Catch 22
Sara Maurer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Maurer, Sara (2004) "Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson: Class Action Catch 22," South Carolina Law
Review: Vol. 55 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Maurer: Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson: Class Action Catch 22

Dow CHEMICAL CO. V. STEPHENSON:
CLASS ACTION CATCH 22

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson,' an equally divided United States
Supreme Court affirmed a Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision that held that
a 1984 global settlement of a class action against manufacturers of the toxic
herbicide "Agent Orange" does not bar a 1999 product liability action by a veteran
whose injuries became apparent only after the complete diminution of the settlement
fund.2
During service in the Vietnam War, several hundred thousand soldiers were
exposed to Agent Orange. In 1978, many of these veterans and their families filed
suits in various state and federal courts against chemical companies, alleging that
their exposure to Agent Orange caused their injuries The cases were consolidated
and the plaintiffs' class was certified as including both currently injured veterans
and exposure-only veterans. 4 Before trial, the parties reached a settlement to cover
all claims arising out of the exposure; the settlement was subsequently approved as
fair, reasonable, and adequate.5 In 1989 and 1990, after the settlement, two groups
of veterans displayed injuries and sued the same companies that had previously
settled with the class.6 A district court dismissed these plaintiffs' claims as barred
by the original settlement.7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, expressly rejecting the argument that
the veterans, Ivy and Hartman, were inadequately represented as future claimants
and
in the original class action.8 In 1998 and 1999, two more veterans, Stephenson
9 The
Orange.
Agent
to
exposure
their
from
resulting
injuries
for
sued
Isaacson,
district court also dismissed these claims as barred by the prior settlement, rejecting
the argument that the plaintiffs were inadequately represented in the original
settlement.' 0 However, relying on Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor" and Ortiz

1. 123 S.Ct. 2161 (2003).
2. Id. at 2161-62.
3. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 988 (2d Cir. 1980).
4. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).

5. Id. at 748.
6. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1428, 1430 (2d Cir. 1993).

7. Id.
8. Id. at 1437.
9. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 255-56 (2d Cir. 2001).

10. Id. at 256.
11. 521 U.S. 591,627 (1997) (holding that a class with currently injured plaintiffs and plaintiffs
at risk of future injury defeats adequate representation because of the inherent conflict between the two
subclasses). See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
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v. FibreboardCorp.,2 both decided after the original Agent Orange cases, the
Second Circuit vacated and remanded the case to the district court, holding that the
plaintiffs were inadequately represented in the original litigation and permitting the
collateral attack. 3
The practical effect of the Supreme Court's divided decision affirming the
Second Circuit leaves several important issues undecided. The Supreme Court did
not explicitly resolve the issues of collateral attack and adequacy of representation,
and thus, the decision of the Second Circuit stands. As a result of the Supreme
Court's holding, the plaintiff can proceed with a collateral attack against the
defendant, Dow Chemical Co. ("Dow"), claiming inadequate representation. Dow,
however, arguably settled the same claim twelve years ago in the expectation that
it would be a final judgment.
Although an open and controversial issue, the district court correctly dismissed
the plaintiff's claim because the prior settlement barred his suit. The Second
Circuit's decision, if followed, has negative ramifications. Most notably, the
decision will jeopardize other class settlements by allowing post-hoc assessments
involving new law and new principles. The decision disrupts the well-established
principles of res judicata and finality, goes against the principles underlying class
actions and settlements, lowers the incentive to make future settlements, and works
an injustice to Dow, who relied on the settlement as final. This places Dow and
future defendants in an awkward "catch 22," because they will have to decide
between proceeding to trial and perhaps risking huge judgments, or settling and
risking that later plaintiffs will circumvent the settlement and sue again. Thus, in
neither alternative are Dow and future defendants fully protected. Instead, they find
themselves in a catch 22 where no decision is completely safe.
In a recent case in South Carolina, HospitalityManagement Associates,Inc. v.
Shell Oil Co., 4 the Supreme Court of South Carolina denied a collateral attack and
held that the appropriate scope of review for collateral attacks on the due process
rulings of two other state court nationwide class action settlements was a limited
one, in which the court would only take into consideration "whether the procedures
in the prior litigation allowed a full and fair opportunity to litigate the due process
issues.' 5 Although no case in the Fourth Circuit has addressed whether or not a
plaintiff can collaterally attack settlements in mass tort claims, the potential for the
situation to arise provides good cause for South Carolina attorneys to be aware of
the 2003 Dow Chemical decision and its implications on class action settlements.
Settlements in mass tort litigation have been prolific, and the possibility exists that

12. 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999) (following Amchem that a class consisting of holders of present and

future claims requires division into homogeneous subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), with separate
representation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel). See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying

text.
13. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 261.
14. No. 25764, 2003 WL 23147500 (S.C. Jan. 12, 2004).
15. Id. at "12.
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an absent class member may seek to challenge the finality of such cases. Under
Amchem and Ortiz future classes will not contain the inherently conflicting present
and future claimants; however, the question remains whether courts will allow
parties to retroactively attack settlements reached before these decisions. The
Fourth Circuit should not follow the Second Circuit in retroactively applying such
principles.
This Note argues that the Second Circuit opinion sets a dangerous precedent
that the Supreme Court should reject. Further, the Fourth Circuit should reject the
Second Circuit's reasoning if the issue arises. Part II of this Note examines the
background of Agent Orange litigation and the original plaintiffs' case. Part III
explores the aspects and complications of the Second Circuit's decision allowing
a future plaintiff to pursue a collateral attack to challenge the adequacy of
representation. Part IV concludes that the consequences of allowing such a
collateral attack outweigh the interest in the plaintiff s due process rights. Part V
challenges the Second Circuit's use ofAmchem and Ortiz to retroactively apply new
principles and subsequent facts to settled cases, and Part VI discusses the
consequences of the Second Circuit's allowance of a collateral attack and the
retroactive application of new law.
II. BACKGROUND

A. OriginalAgent Orange Litigation
During their service in Vietnam, several hundred thousand soldiers were
6
exposed to Agent Orange, a chemical containing the toxic by-product dioxin.
Beginning in 1978, several individual veterans and their families filed suits in
various state and federal courts against chemical companies alleging that their
exposure to Agent Orange caused them injuries.

7

All of these cases were

consolidated in a multidistrict litigation proceeding" and transferred to the Eastern
9
District of New York, with jurisdiction based on diversity.

16. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1428 (2d Cir. 1993) (giving a
complete history of all Agent Orange litigation).
17. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 988 (2d Cir. 1980).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 provides for transferring related cases pending in different districts to a
single district for pretrial proceedings. This section is designed both to promote judicial economy and
to avoid conflict and duplication in discovery by consolidating related actions for pretrial purposes. In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740,750-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F. 2d 145
(2d Cir. 1987) (citing 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3861

(1976)). Once a case has been transferred, the transferee court has complete jurisdiction for pretrial'
purposes. It can grant summary judgment or approve a settlement. Moreover, the transferee court can
handle matters relating to class action certification to prevent inconsistent rulings and to promote
judicial efficiency. Id. at 751-52 (citing In re Piper Aircraft Distribution Sys. Antitrust Litig., 405 F.
Supp. 1402, 1403-04 (J.P.M.L. 1975)).

19. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. at 751.
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In 1983, the district court certified the following class:
[T]hose persons who were in the United States, New Zealand or
Australian Armed Forces at any time from 1961 to 1972 who were
injured while in or near Vietnam by exposure to Agent Orange or
other phenoxy herbicides, including those composed in whole or
in part of 2, 4, 5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid or containing some
amount of 2, 3, 7, 8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin. The class also
includes spouses, parents, and children ofthe veterans born before
January 1, 1984, directly or derivatively injured as a result of the
exposure.2 °

In warranting class certification, the district court found that the plaintiffs met
the prerequisites of both Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 2' Furthermore, the court ordered extensive notice by mail, radio,
television, magazine, and newspaper.22 Pursuant to Rule 23(b), the notice provided
that plaintiffs not wishing to be considered part of the class had to affirmatively opt
out of the class by means set forth in the notice.23

In 1984, before trial was to begin, the parties reached a settlement that would
establish a $180 million 24 settlement fund to cover all claims arising out of Agent

20. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). In his
opinion, Chief Judge Weinstein justified class action certification by noting the extreme burden on the
court system to try these suits on a one-by-one basis and the encouragement of settlement that
certification fosters. Id. at 720-21.
21. Id. at 721, 724. Rule 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there arequestions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims ... of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In reference to Rule 23(b)(3), the court found
(1) that the affirmative defenses and the question of general causation are
common to the class, (2) that those questions predominate over any questions
affecting individual members, and (3) given the enormous potential size of
plaintiffs' case and thejudicial economies that would result from a class trial, a
class action is superior to all other methods for a 'fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy.'
Id. at 724 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A)).
22. Id. at 729-30.
23. Id. at 731. The court ordered summary judgment against those plaintiffs who opted out on
grounds of lack of proof of causation, lack of proof of which manufacturer was responsible, and that
the military contractor defense barred their claims. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d
187, 189 (2d Cir. 1987).
24. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that this
amount is a "nuisance value," given that there were over 240,000 claimants, because their cases were
weak due both to difficulties in proving causation and the existence and likely success of the military
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Orange exposure, $10 million of which was reserved to indemnify defendants
25
agreement
against any future identical state court judgments. The settlement
'2 6 and the court
specifically included "persons who have not yet manifested injury,
7
approved it as fair, reasonable, and adequate.
The distribution plan for the fund provided that seventy-five percent be directly
distributed to disabled veterans and to survivors of deceased veterans, and the
remaining twenty-five percent be used to create an assistance foundation (Agent
Orange Class Assistance Program) to fund projects that would serve the interests
of the class as a whole. 8 Payments to the injured veterans were to extend for only
ten years, until December 31, 1994, whereas the assistance program would benefit
class members who would become sick after December 31, 1994.29 The court of
diverse interests of
appeals upheld the settlement, rejecting an argument that "the
30 Judge Weinstein of
the class make adequate representation virtually impossible.
the district court determined that this argument failed because the various common
weaknesses of the plaintiffs' claims were identical to all plaintiffs, and the court of
appeals agreed." Thus, the court certified the class because all of the members had
the same inherent problems with their claims. The settlement and distribution
scheme then became final, binding all members of the class, including presently
injured and exposure-only plaintiffs. The defendants could not be sued again by
any veteran exposed to Agent Orange.
B. First Attempt at Collateral Attack Denied: The Ivy and Hartman
Litigation
In 1989 and 1990, two veterans, Ivy and Hartman, manifested injuries after the
settlement date and sued the same companies that had previously settled with the
class. 2 They both brought class action suits in state court against these companies,
33
relying explicitly on state law. However, the defendants removed the cases to
federal court and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the cases
to the Eastern District of New York, the same court where the original litigation

contractor defense).
25. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1429 (2d Cir. 1993).
aff'd, 818
26. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740,865 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).

27. Id. at 748.
28. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 158.

29. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396, 1417 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
30. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 167.

31. See id. at 171-74. Common weaknesses of plaintiffs' claims include difficulty of proving

defense. Id.
details about exposure, difficulty of proving causation, and the shared military contractor

at 172-73.

32. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1430 (2d Cir. 1993).
33. Id.
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occurred.34 The district court dismissed their claims as barred by both the original
Agent Orange settlement and the previous court's order enjoining future suits by
class members.35
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal and expressly
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they had been inadequately represented as "atrisk ' 3 6 class members (or future claimants) in connection with the original class
action.37 The court justified the lack of separate counsel for class members whose
symptoms would manifest after the 1984 settlement by noting the nature of the
settlement plan as well as the inherent proof problems in all of the class members'
claims:
[T]he fundamental fairness of the Agent Orange I settlement
remains unshaken. Notwithstanding the legal and scientific
developments of the past nine years, the chances of recovery are
nearly as speculative today as they were at the time of settlement.
Appellants' challenges to the adequacy of their representation
therefore must be rejected. .

.

. The unique circumstances

surrounding Agent Orange I-in particular, the even-handed
treatment of both identified and unidentified legitimate claimants
in the Agent OrangeIsettlement and the dim prospects of success
both then and now-rendered additional protections unnecessary.
The representation in Agent OrangeI was more than adequate to
protect appellants' interests.38
Thus, the court succinctly dismissed this subsequent attempt at a collateral attack
against the defendants, including Dow, who appeared in the original Agent Orange
litigation.
During the ten year period of the settlement fund (1988 through 1997),3 $196.5
million was distributed as cash payments to approximately 52,000 class members.4 °
The program paid approximately $52 million to "after-manifested" claimants,
whose deaths or disabilities occurred after the settlement date, while the Class

34. Id.

35. Id.

36. The court held that "injury occurs when adeleterious substance enters a person's body, even
though its adverse effects are not immediately apparent." Id. at 1433. Thus, although these plaintiffs
were already injured within the meaning of the class and were considered members of the class at the
time of settlement, they had not yet manifested symptoms.

37.
38.
39.
approval

Id. at 1436.
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1437 (2d Cir. 1993).
The ten year period was postponed due to the appeals process and began in 1988 after the
of the settlement by the court of appeals in 1987. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d

249, 255 (2d Cir. 2001).

40. Id.
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Assistance Program distributed approximately $71.3 million."
C. Second Attempt at Collateral Attack Allowed: Stephenson v. Dow
Chemical Co.
Stephenson served in Vietnam from 1965 to 1970, during which time he was
42
In 1998, he was diagnosed with bone
in regular contact with Agent Orange.
court in the Western District of
federal
in
suit
marrow cancer and in 1999 filed
transferred the case to Judge
Panel
Louisiana. The Multidistrict Litigation
43
Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York, who oversaw the previous
litigation.
Isaacson served in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969; one of his tasks was spraying
Agent Orange." He was diagnosed with non-Hodgkins lymphoma in 1996 and
brought suit in state court in 1998, where his claim was removed to federal court
under the All Writs Act45 andjoined with Stephenson's federal court claim that was
46
transferred to Judge Weinstein.
As would be expected based on the voluminous history of the Agent Orange
litigation, the district court granted a 12(b)(6) dismissal under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, "rejecting plaintiffs' argument that they were inadequately
represented and concluding that plaintiffs' suit was an impermissible collateral
47
attack on the prior settlement."
Instead of following this well-established reasoning, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals vacated and remanded the district court's dismissal, holding that the suit
48
The Second Circuit concluded "that the
was a permissible collateral attack.

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 256.
44. Id. at 255.
45. "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (2000). The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded Isaacson's
claim back to state court in light of Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 123 S. Ct. 366 (2002)
(holding that the All Writs Act cannot be used to remove a state court claim if the federal court would
not otherwise have original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441). Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123
S. Ct. 2161, 2161 (2003). The court in Syngenta noted that "section 1441 requires that a federal court
have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be removed from a state court. The All Writs
Act ... is not a substitute for that requirement." Syngenta, 123 S. Ct. at 371. The Syngenta court
looked to the plain meaning of the Act, which "authorizes writs 'in aid of [the courts'] respective
jurisdictions' without creating any federal subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 369 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (a)). However, if a state court action might frustrate a district court's prior orders, the All Writs
Act authorizes an injunction to stop the party from pursuing his action in state court. Id. See generally
19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 204 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing
extraordinary writs).
46. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 2001).
47. Id. at 256.
48. Id. at 261.
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plaintiffs' collateral attack, which seeks only to prevent the prior settlement from
operating as res judicata to their claims, is permissible. '49 The court gave two
reasons for this conclusion: (1) neither the Supreme Court nor the district court has
considered the adequacy of representation for plaintiffs whose injuries manifested
after the depletion of the settlement fund; ° and (2) collateral attacks on the
adequacy of representation have been allowed in other circuits. 51 Thus, the
plaintiffs' argument that they were not proper parties to the judgment was enough
to sustain a collateral attack against Dow.
The Second Circuit then determined that the plaintiffs were not adequately
represented at trial because of the Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor 2 and Ortiz v.
FibreboardCorp." decisions, which found that "Rule 23(a)(4)'s requirement that
the named parties 'will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class' had
not been satisfied" when a class included currently injured and exposure-only
plaintiffs.5 4 Thus, the court held that these two cases, decided years after the
settlement was final, indicated that the plaintiffs Stephenson and Isaacson were not
adequately represented in the original Agent Orange litigation.5"
On appeal, the Supreme Court gave no guidance. In its two-sentence opinion,
the Court held: "With respect to respondent Daniel Raymond Stephenson... the
judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court."56 The Supreme Court remanded
Isaacson's claim.57 Thus, Stephenson is allowed to proceed with his collateral
attack against Dow. More importantly, the Second Circuit's analysis, with its many
foreseeable and detrimental consequences, will stand until the issue arises again and
the Supreme Court decides to rule definitively.
III.

COLLATERAL ATTACK ON ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION

The Second Circuit's opinion raises serious questions about class action
settlements and their supposed finality. Moreover, the equally divided affirmance
by the Supreme Court leaves the issue open and lends no guidance on these
important issues.

49. Id. at 257.

50. Id. at 257-58.
51. Id. at 258-59 (citing Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973); Williams v. Gen.
Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266 (7th Cir. 1998); Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 F.3d
1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 1998); Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1994)).
52. 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (holding that a class with currently injured and exposure-only plaintiffs
in an asbestos class action creates an inherent conflict and thus the adequacy of representation
requirement is not met); see discussion infra Part IV.A.
53. 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999) ("A class divided between holders ofpresent and future claims...
requires division into homogeneous subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), with separate representation
to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel.").
54. Stephenson, 527 F.3d at 260.
55. Id. at 261.
56. Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161, 2161-62 (2003).
57. Id. at 2161.
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A. Adequacy ofRepresentation is Res Judicata
Permitting this collateral attack under the guise of protecting a plaintiff's due
process rights is error. Previous courts held that all of the members of the class,
including the plaintiff, were adequately represented; therefore, the issue is res
judicata. The collateral attack allowed by the Second Circuit and the Supreme
Court actually violates Dow's due process rights to finality and creates a broad
umbrella under which certain unsatisfied class members can challenge the res
judicata effect of a final judgment.
Res judicata provides that a matter already litigated and resolved, including
58
class action settlements, is binding on all parties and cannot be relitigated. In the
long and detailed history of the Agent Orange litigation, the due process rights of
the class members had been decided twice before.59 First, the district court analyzed
the Rule 23(a) requirements, including 23(a)(4)'s adequacy of representation, and
found that all requirements were met.60 Next, when the certification and settlement
plan were reviewed on appeal, the Second Circuit revisited the adequacy of
representation and expressly rejected the appellant's argument that the "diverse
interests of the class make adequate representation virtually impossible."'" The
Second Circuit again rejected the same argument brought in the subsequent Ivy and
Hartman suits. The court said that no subclass of future claimants with separate
representation was necessary and reiterated the "fundamental fairness" of the
settlement.62
These specific rejections of the "adequacy of representation" argument should
have been extremely persuasive in the Stephenson case. At the time of the
settlement, both the Ivy and Hartman plaintiffs and Stephenson were at-risk future
claimants who the court refused to find needed sub-classification or separate
counsel to receive adequate representation.6 3 Thus, the decision in Stephenson's
case directly contradicts the same court's reasoning just years earlier. There is no
real difference between the Ivy and Hartman plaintiffs and Stephenson: they all
were in the same position at the finalization of the settlement. The only
distinguishing fact is that Stephenson manifested injury after the depletion of the
settlement fund, but this should not make a difference. Their outcomes should have
been the same. The reference to funda-mental fairness in the Ivy and Hartman
appeal is ironic considering the essence of due process with respect to Dow. By
determining that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been satisfied,
the court authoritatively concluded that all the class members' due process rights

58. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003)
(No. 02-271).
59. See supra notes 20, 26, 36 and accompanying text.
60. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
61. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 167 (2d Cir. 1987).
62. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1436-37 (2d Cir. 1993).
63. Id.
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had been honored and respected. Conversely, while the Stephenson court appears
extremely concerned with class members' due process rights (even though they had
the opportunity to opt out, object, or appeal), it summarily disregards any question
64
as to Dow's due process rights in the finality of its settlement payment.
Considering the definition of the class,6" the Second Circuit's reasoning in
Stephenson's case is not well thought-out or thorough. The court gives no
consideration to Dow's reliance on the class definition or the multiple decisions66
holding that the representation of the entire class was adequate. Further unfairness
exists in that Dow has relied on the judgment for over fifteen years.
The Second Circuit permits collateral attack on a broad ground, allowing a
subsequent challenge for a slight variation that the lower court did not originally
perceive. The court of appeals specifically held that the plaintiff can proceed
because "neither this Court [n]or the district court has addressed specifically the
adequacy of representation for those members of the class whose injuries
manifested after depletion of the settlement funds."67 This implies that the original
district court, in 1980, should have considered the possibility of class members
manifesting injuries ten-plus years later. This is a heavy burden. The essence of a
settlement-a decision based on the present value of the suit-is destroyed.
Settlement is a risk taken by all parties. The Second Circuit's ruling allows the
plaintiffs to hedge their bets both by taking advantage of subsequent circumstances
and by allowing them to renege on the original bet.
The plaintiffs claim they were not aware of the Agent Orange litigation and
were not injured at the time so that settlement without them was improper and a
violation of due process.68 However, the notice given at the time was the best notice
practicable under the circumstances.69 The notice included mail to all who served
in Vietnam during the time in question, as well as multiple national media
advertisements.7 ° Arguably, the court could have done little more to ensure absolute
notice. In addition, it is odd that the plaintiffs were unaware of the litigation
considering the heightened public interest and the likelihood that these plaintiffs had
acquaintances or old friends who were similarly situated.

64. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257 (2d Cir. 2001) (assuming plaintiffs were
not part of the class at all and thus, the injunction associated with the settlement would not be binding
on them). Presumably Dow has no finality interest because these plaintiffs were never a party to the
original action.
65. See supra text accompanying note 4.
66. Five decisions determined that the class representation was adequate: (1) the district court
in the original litigation, (2) the court of appeals in the original litigation, (3) the district court in Ivy
and Hartman, (4) the court of appeals in Ivy and Hartman, and (5) the district court in Stephenson.
67. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 257-58.
68. Brief in Opposition at 1, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003) (No. 02-

271).
69. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
70. Id. at 729-30.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss3/6
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B. Conflict with Other Circuitsand South Carolina
The plaintiffs maintain that "[]udgment in a class action is not secure from
collateral attack unless the absentees were adequately and vigorously represented"
7
and that this requirement was not fulfilled in this case.
The Second Circuit's rejection of the application of res judicata to collateral
attacks when the plaintiffs had the opportunity to opt out, object, or appeal conflicts
with other circuits that limit the scope of collateral attack to plaintiffs who were not
given an opportunity to object.72 In Epstein v. MCA, Inc.,73 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that a certifying court's
74
determination of the adequacy of representation is subject to collateral review.
The Epstein court succinctly held:
Simply put, the absent class members' due process right to
adequate representation is protected not by collateral review, but
by the certifying court initially, and thereafter by appeal within the
state system and by direct review in the United States Supreme
Court .

. .

. [D]ue process does not require collateral second-

guessing of those determinations and that review.7"
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected a
broad notion of collateral attack by holding that a court-approved settlement may
apply against an absent class member "so long as acceptableproceduralsafeguards
have been employed."76 The court also stated that the dissatisfied party's recourse
was to object and appeal, not to collaterally attack "in the vain pursuit of back-door
relief., 77 Unlike the Stephenson case, Nottingham involved a situation where the
plaintiffs were not even afforded the opportunity to opt out and the court still barred

71. Brief in Opposition at 11, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003) (No. 02271) (quoting Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 590 F.2d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1978), affd 444 U.S. 472
(1980)); see also Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998)

("[T]he unnamed class member can raise a collateral attack based on due process."); Crawford v.
Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding collateral attacks permissible when plaintiff's
interests are not represented); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973) (providing test for
collateral review of adequate representation).
72. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12-14, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161
(2003) (No. 02-271) (citing Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1004 (1999); Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29 (1 st Cir. 1991); Grimes v. Vitalink
Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553 (3d Cir. 1994)).
73. 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).
74. Id. at 648.
75. Id. (citing Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1558 (3d Cir. 1994)).
76. Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29,33 (1 st Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
77. Id.
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the attempt at collateral attack.78
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated
that "all ordinary class members are bound by the deal struck by their named
representatives in the event the court determines that they were adequately and
fairly represented during the course of the negotiations."79 The court also noted that
once the dissatisfied class members challenged on direct appeals, they were granted
all the process that was due.8" Thus, a subsequent collateral attack as to the
adequacy of representation was not afforded the absent class members because the
issues were addressed and objections heard in the original court that certified and
approved the class settlement.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina also followed the Epstein reasoning that
"broad collateral review of the due process requirements is not available."'" In
Hospitality ManagementAssociates Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., the court held that both
Tennessee and Alabama state court-approved class action settlements were entitled
to full faith and credit because, in conducting the limited scope of collateral review,
the state supreme court found minimal due process had been afforded absent class
members.82 In this case, building owners sued Shell for defective plumbing systems
and Shell argued they were precluded from suing because they were class members
in the Tennessee and Alabama settlements.83 The owners argued that as absent
class members in those settlements they were not afforded due process because of
lack of sufficient notice and inadequate representation. 4 The court acknowledged
the difference in opinion as to what the appropriate scope of review should be: "[I]t
remains an open, and hotly litigated, question as to whether limited collateral review
is required . . . or whether a broader, merits-oriented collateral review is
permitted."8 5 The court held that "only a limited collateral review is appropriate"
and agreed with Epstein that "due process requires that an absent class member's
rights are protected by the adoption and utilization of appropriate procedures by the
certifying court; thereafter, the merits of the certifying court's determinations are
subject to direct appellate review."8 6

78. Id. at 32. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only requires the opt-out option in
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. In this case, the court certified the class pursuant to Delaware Chancery
Court Rule 23(b)(2), which mirrors Federal Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 31. Rule 23(c)(3) states in part: "The
judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2), whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class
.FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). Thus, it was within the court's discretion in this case either to grant or
to deny opt-out status.
79. Grimes, 17 F.3d at 1558.
80. Id.
81. Hospitality Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., No. 25764,2003 WL 23147500, at *5 (S.C.
Jan. 12, 2004).
82. Id. at*1.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *4.
85. Id. at *7.
86. Id. at *8.
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In the Stephenson decision, the Second Circuit relied on Hansberryv. Lee8 7 to
support its holding that Stephenson's collateral attack was proper.88 However, the
United States Supreme Court in Hansberryalso said that "there has been a failure
of due process only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure
adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be
bound by it."89 The courts in the original Stephenson litigation thoroughly analyzed
the due process requirements of Rule 23 and addressed the adequacy of the class
representation. The plaintiffs contended, however, that due process requires the
analysis of specific situations.9" Thus, the court of appeals sets a high standard in
requiring a court to take into consideration things it could not possibly know.9
Specifically, under this standard the district court needed to know that the
settlement fund would be depleted before certain class members' injuries
manifested.
Fundamental fairness to class members does not require this further judicial
proceeding. Due process of law only requires the "conscientious application by the
court of the requirements of Rule 23, [and] fundamental fairness does not demand
anything more."92 The Stephenson court allows a member of the class who did not
actually appear in the suit prior to final judgment to question the representation.
The court "reinvent[s] the problem of inefficiency and second guessing that is
solved by the rule of finality and recognition of judgments. 93
The Second Circuit insists that Stephenson is different because the plaintiffs
argue that they were not proper parties to the settlement instead of attacking the
finality of the settlement itself.94 However, the settlement was all-inclusive because
it included all veterans exposed to Agent Orange, whether the individual veterans
had manifested injury or not. These plaintiffs, as veterans clearly fitting the class
description, were members of the class and were bound both by the settlement and
the original court's determinations on adequacy of representation. As noted earlier,
this same court's decision regarding the Ivy and Hartman attempt at collateral attack
flies in the face of the Stephenson holding. At the time of certification and
settlement, both sets of plaintiffs were in the same situation: they had only been
exposed to Agent Orange. The Ivy and Hartman plaintiffs' injuries manifested after
the settlement date, as did the injuries of the plaintiffs in Stephenson. Also, the Ivy
and Hartman plaintiffs attacked adequacy of representation, as did the Stephenson

87. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
88. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 258 (2d Cir. 2001).
89. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42, quoted in Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir.
1999) (emphasis added).
90. Brief in Opposition at 2, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S.Ct. 2161 (2003) (No. 02271).
91. Id.
92. William T. Allen, FinalityofJudgments in Class Actions: A Comment on Epstein v. MCA,
Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149,1160 (1998).
93. Id. at 1159-60.
94. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 259 (2d Cir. 2001).
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plaintiffs.
Stephenson and Isaacson argued that the facts in their cases were so egregious
that to disallow their suit would be a flagrant violation of their rights.95
Nonetheless, while the facts were serious, they were no more so than in other tort
cases. The plaintiffs' case is sympathetic; however, the problems with the merits
of their claim outweigh this argument. These problems deal with proof of
causation, proof of which manufacturer was responsible, and the military contractor
defense that would arguably bar their claims.96 The court should remember the
context. The plaintiffs should not be able to upset another's due process rights
solely on the visage of serious illness.
Because multidistrict litigation allows courts to transfer actions, a strong need
exists for uniformity among the circuits so that plaintiffs will not shop around for
a favorable court.9 7

Other circuits give strong deference to a lower court's

settlement determinations.98 However, the Second Circuit's ruling creates a system
more accepting of collateral attacks, and this departure from holdings of other
circuits could foster forum shopping in future objections to various aspects of class
actions.
Further consequences of the Second Circuit's holding include
encouraging absent class members to withhold any objection and drastically
reducing the incentive for defendants to settle.99 Allowing collateral attacks
disrupts the goals of class action litigation and settlement. Efficiency and judicial
administration are not served when any class member can question the finality of
a judgment. Also, defendants will be less likely to settle if there exists the
possibility that the settlement will not end the litigation with finality.
IV. RETROACTIVITY OF NEW LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND SUBSEQUENT FACTS

A.

New Legal Principles

In addition to the ramifications of allowing collateral attacks ofalready decided
issues like adequacy of representation, the Second Circuit's analysis breeds more

95. Brief in Opposition at 2, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003) (No. 02271).
96. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1987).
97. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003)
(No. 02-271).
98. Id. at 12-18 (citing Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2002)
(noting special duty of district judge as fiduciary in relying on its prior determinations)); see also
Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648-50 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that as long as lower court
complied with due process, collateral attack was barred); Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp.,
17 F.3d 1553, 1558 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that opportunity provided in lower Delaware state court
proceeding comported with due process); Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29, 33
(1st Cir. 1991) (giving deference to due process determinations by Delaware courts).
99. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003)
(No. 02-271).
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negative consequences. In determining that the plaintiffs were not barred by res
judicata because they were not adequately represented as proper parties in the class,
the court relied on two United States Supreme Court decisions defining and laying
out new guidelines for Rule 23.100

First, the Second Circuit used the ruling in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor'0 ' to reopen the prior final judgment of the Dow settlement. Amchem
involved a class action certification seeking to settle globally current and future
asbestos claims. The district court certified the class, but the appellate court
vacated, holding that the certification failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23.102
The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court and held that such a "sprawling"
class did not meet "Rule 23(a)(4)'s requirement that the named parties 'will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class."" 3 The Court found an inherent
conflict in a class made up of currently injured and exposure-only plaintiffs:
Named parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on
behalf of a single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete
subclasses. In significant respects, the interests of those within
the single class are not aligned. Most saliently, for the currently
injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That
goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in
ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future."°
Despite the new standard set, the Court in Amchem emphasized that there was
no assurance of adequate protection in either the terms of the settlement or in the
Perhaps if the negotiations and terms of the
structure of the negotiations.'
settlement were more detailed and thorough, as in Stephenson, the class would have
constituted adequate representation.
The dissent in Amchem questioned the Court's ruling on adequacy on the
grounds that the district court was in the best position to determine the question of
°6
adequacy because the answer depends on the circumstances of each case." The
dissent thinks this conflict will always exist to some extent in mass tort cases, and
further, some otherwise unattainable benefits may exist for the future claimants for
being part of the class; namely, assets will not be exhausted before their claims
materialize and the statute of limitations may be extended.' 7
The second case on which the Second Circuit relied was Ortiz v. Fibreboard

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 259 (2d Cir. 2001).
521 U.S. 591 (1997).
Id. at 597.
Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 260 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-26).
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 637 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Corp.'"8 The Ortiz Court observed the new rule defined in Amchem, maintaining:
"[I]t is obvious after Amchem that a class divided between holders of present and
future claims (some of the latter involving no physical injury and attributable to
claimants not yet born) requires division into homogeneous subclasses under Rule
23(c)(4)(B), with separate representation to eliminate conflicting interests of
counsel."' 0 9 In Stephenson, the Second Circuit relied on this new principle that an
inherent conflict exists when current claimants and future claimants are members
of the same class.
In Hospitality Management Associates, Inc., the Supreme Court of South
Carolina noted that the Amchem ruling of inherent conflict in classes with both
present and future claimants came after the settlements being challenged."'
However, the.court dismissed the argument that prevailed in the Second Circuit that
Amchem be applied retroactively to find inadequate representation."' It reasoned
that the limited scope of review applied on collateral attack did not require such
application. 2 The court found it "patent that both [Tennessee and Alabama] courts
had procedures in place to ensure adequate representation.""3
Importantly, the Amchem and Ortiz plaintiffs differ from the Agent Orange
plaintiffs in that the conflict between class members inAmchem and Ortiz rested on
the strength of their claims." 4 The groups were much broader due to the asbestos
nature of the litigation and the fight revolved around who had strong claims and
who had weak claims.' ' Conversely, the district court and the court of appeals in
the Agent Orange litigation both noted that all class members had poor chances of
success through litigation." 6 Also, Agent Orange class members were easily
identifiable because they all had served in Vietnam. Asbestos was much more
widespread with more possible sources. The Agent Orange court developed a
neutral distribution plan after they reached settlement, something the asbestos class
lacked. These differences may explain the Court's language in Amchem regarding
adequacy of representation and may account for its holding that an inherent lack of
adequate representation exists.
Even assuming that the same inherent conflict principle would invalidate the
Agent Orange certification and settlement if brought today, the Stephenson court
should not have used new interpretations of the standards of Rule 23 to determine

108. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
109. Id. at 856 (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627).
110. Hospitality Mgmt. Assocs., Inc v. Shell Oil, Co., No. 25764, 2003 WL 23147500, at *11
(S.C. Jan. 12, 2004).
111. Id. at*12.
112. Id. ("In addition, we believe the arguments raised by respondents on Amchem 's applicability do not require resolution for our limited review.").
113. Id.
114. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003)
(No. 02-271).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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whether they were met more than ten years earlier. The court's reinterpretation of
Rule 23 in Stephenson goes against both due process protection from retroactive
litigation and notions of fundamental fairness. Dow relied on the judgment as final,
yet the court allowed the plaintiffs to take advantage of subsequent case law to
reopen the case.
B. FactualHindsight
The Second Circuit partially relied on factual hindsight in determining that the
plaintiffs' collateral attacks could proceed because the plaintiffs were inadequately
represented." 7 Such reliance misses the mark. At the time of the certification and
settlement, only two types of possible class members existed: those who had
current claims and those who had potential future claims. At the time of settlement,
the Stephenson plaintiffs were in the same position as all other individuals with
exposure-only possible future claims. The court deemed them all adequately
represented.
Following this reasoning puts potential plaintiffs in a win-win situation,
allowing them to take advantage of membership in a class settlement while
simultaneously allowing them to reserve the right to later deny that membership in
light of subsequent events. Under this interpretation, plaintiffs take no risk.
Conversely, defendants face all of the risk and may ultimately be liable to the same
parties with whom they have already settled. This risk imbalance could result in
hostile and hesitant negotiations because the defendant must see into the future to
consider all possible factual occurrences that could spark subsequent litigation. At
the very least, this promotes inefficient settlement. Defendants will end up settling
for less and will face more suits and challenges to the previous settlement, a result
that goes against the judicial economy that class action litigation is supposed to
create.
The Second Circuit's finding of inadequate representation relied the rest of the
way on the Amchem and Ortiz decisions. The court regarded the idea that an
as new
inherent conflict exists in a class with current claimants and future claimants
' 18
decisions."
action
class
"landmark
as
decisions
the
law, referring to
By applying such new law in a collateral attack, the court goes against the wellsettled principle that courts rarely should apply new laws retroactively.' '9 The
117. Brief for the Petitioners at46, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003) (No.
02-271).
118. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)).
119. Brief for the Petitioners at 47-48, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003)
(No. 02-271) (citing Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758 (1995)); see also Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) ("[It] has long been established that a final civil judgment entered
under a given rule of law may withstand subsequent judicial change in that rule."); James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia., 501 U.S. 529, 541 (1991) ("[R]etroactivity in civil cases must be limited by
the need for finality.").
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doctrine against the retroactive application of new laws is founded in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution:
"The Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that
may be compromised by retroactive legislation. .o
,, This doctrine is invaluable:
The presumption against the retroactive application of new laws
is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law
affords the individual citizen. That presumption "is deeply rooted
in ourjurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older
than our Republic." This doctrine finds expression in several
provisions of our Constitution. .

.

. In both the civil and the

criminal context, the Constitution places limits on the sovereign's
ability to use its lawmaking power to modify bargains .... "'
All parties at the time of both the original class certification and the settlement
had current law at their disposal. To allow one party to take advantage of a
favorable change in how the law is interpreted would be to deny the others their due
process of law. Although plaintiffs find themselves in a hampered position, it
violates fundamental fairness to sacrifice Dow's due process rights to accommodate
the plaintiffs, who took their chances by not opting out of or objecting to the class
and now regret that choice.
The Second Circuit should not have disregarded the adequacy determinations
already decided twice before. The court summarily justified the oversight of prior
determinations in light of subsequent events. The court should have accorded
greater weight to the opinions of the courts below.
C. Substantial Consequencesof Retroactivity
The continuation of this collateral attack violates Dow's due process rights.
The implication of the Supreme Court's decision is absurd: In order for Dow to
have settled completely the Agent Orange litigation, it would have had to consider
every possible change in the law that could undo the finality of the settlement. This
is obviously impossible, yet the Court seems to set this standard. The settlement in
this case was final thirteen years before the Court decided Amchem and fifteen years
before Ortiz. Best stated, "[T]he res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed
judgment on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may have been
wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case."2

120. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433,440 n.12 (1997) (citing Landgrafv. USI Film Prod., 511
U.S. 244, 266 (1994)).
121. Id. at 439-40 (quoting Landgraf 511 U.S. at 265).
122. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394,398 (1981), quoted in Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 24, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003) (No. 02-271) (noting a
special need for strict application ofresjudicata in complex multiple party litigation).
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CONSEQUENCES OF COLLATERAL ATTACK AND APPLICATION OF SUBSEQUENT

LAW
123

of litigation.'
Class actions aim to advance "the efficiency and economy
They exist to enhance access to the courts, to look out for the interests of absentees,
24
and to protect defendants from inconsistent obligations. Allowing an absent class
member to subsequently challenge a judgment based on new interpretations of the
law in a collateral attack defeats the purposes underlying class actions.
The implications of Stephenson seriously impair the goals of class actions by
allowing multiple judgments on the same issue. Further, judicial economy is not
saved when the parties and courts expend resources to deal with litigation on a class
level, only to have class members bring a collateral challenge anyway. Likewise,
the defendants are not shielded from contradicting judgments. Rather, they now
must consider the possibility that dissatisfied class members could bring collateral
attacks against them.'25
Similarly, settlement will be hindered. The law encourages settlement to avoid
drawn-out litigation in pursuit of the same judicial efficiency of the class action
vehicle. However, defendants may be less likely to engage in settlement
negotiations if uncertainty exists as to whether parties can sue again after settlement.
At the very least, the Stephenson decision compromises the settlement tool.
Defendants will settle for as little as possible in anticipation of identical future
attacks, and thus, the plaintiffs may not be sufficiently compensated. The holding
in this case dramatically lowers the incentive for a defendant to settle.
Further, the Second Circuit's holding undermines the principles of res judicata
and finality. The legislature, through the principle of res judicata, has recognized
the need for finality in judicial proceedings "to secure the peace and repose of
26
Finality
society by the settlement of matters capable ofjudicial determination.'
aids
and
judgments,
court
upon
is fair to the parties, fosters respect for and reliance
dockets.
court
the efficiency of the judicial system by avoiding overcrowded
Finality is not served if a judgment or a settlement is always subject to changed
circumstances or law. Again, in the settlement context, a defendant has no
incentive to settle if an unhappy party can later disturb the settlement. In this case,
an injustice befalls Dow, who relied on the settlement as final.
Finally, and most importantly, post-hoc assessments involving new law and new
principles could jeopardize other class settlements. The number of possible
collateral attacks on various judgments and settlements is infinite, and the Second
Circuit's application of subsequent interpretation of the law, with no careful

123. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982); see also 5 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.02 (3d ed. 1999) (listing purposes of class actions).
124. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1980).
125. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003)
(No. 02-271).
126. S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897).
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forethought, could lead other plaintiffs to lodge collateral attacks as well.
Although the Stephenson decision raises serious questions from the standpoint
of the defendant's due process rights, the plaintiffs are not entirely forgotten. In this
particular case, an unfairness seems to work the plaintiffs, who manifested their
injuries after the expiration and depletion of the settlement fund. Why the fund
expired when it did, after only ten years, is unknown. One possible explanation is
the noted weakness of the entire class claim in proving causation. Furthermore, after
ten years, causation would be even more difficult to prove. However, according to
the certifying and approving courts, the entire class was provided due process at the
time. Despite sympathy for the plaintiffs' illnesses, future considerations of
efficiency and stability in the law should have dictated that the plaintiffs' claims
expired.
Is there a potential solution without the negative ramifications discussed above?
Perhaps this is just a rare case. Certainly the case is unique with regard to the
parties involved,' 27 the types of claims, the difficulties with proof, and the time
frame of the distribution plan. Perhaps this decision will provide only a narrow
exception to the otherwise stable rule of res judicata and finality in class action
settlements. However, it is unlikely that other dissatisfied class members in other
class action proceedings will consider the conclusions reached by the Second
Circuit in such a light. In any event, even a narrow exception will inevitably open
the door for parties to argue for future exceptions. A natural fear is that the
exceptions will eventually swallow the rule, and efficient class actions and
settlements will become obsolete.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Agent Orange litigation saga is long and complicated. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed, by an equally divided vote, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision that absent class members can collaterally attack the adequacy
of representation nearly eighteen years after a final settlement, despite the fact that
an opposite determination had already been made several times. The Second
Circuit also held that subsequent law applied in determining the adequacy of
representation and thus applied facts and law arising after the fact that were in the
plaintiffs' favor. The court appliedAmchem and Ortiz in deciding that the plaintiffs
were not adequately represented and could pursue their claims.
Holding that plaintiffs can collaterally attack a settlement flies in the face of
decisions from other circuits, such as Epstein (Ninth Circuit),'2 8 Nottingham (First

127. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 148 (1987) (observing "the nationwide
interest in this litigation and the strong emotions these proceedings have generated among Vietnam
veterans and their families").
128. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1004 (1999).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss3/6

20

2004]

Maurer: Dow Chemical Co. v.
Stephenson: Class Action Catch 22
PROCEDURE
CIVIL

3
Circuit), 129 and Grimes (Third Circuit),' " all holding that a dissatisfied party's
recourse is through direct appeals and opportunities to opt-out. Thus, a potential
forum shopping problem arises, and class action plaintiffs may overload the Second
Circuit.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina began in the right direction by opting
against a broad scope of collateral review in HospitalityManagement Associates,
Inc. 3 I In doing so, it limited the scope of collateral review of due process rulings
of other state courts to whether there were adequate due process safeguards in place
by the ruling court at the time. Further, it rejected applying Amchem at all, holding
that the limited review did not require application of Amchem.
The Fourth Circuit should not follow the Second Circuit and should instead
build on South Carolina's holding. If an absent and unsatisfied class member
attempts to collaterally attack a class action settlement claiming inadequate
representation because of subsequent facts or because of the subsequent principles
established inAmchem and Ortiz, the Fourth Circuit should dismiss the claim. This
is necessary to protect the longstandingjustifications and interests in the class action

vehicle.
There is a possibility that the Second Circuit specifically tailored the holding
of this case to the unique facts of the Agent Orange litigation and that the court will
not apply the holding broadly. However, this is unlikely, and even if the holding
constitutes a narrow exception, it opens the door for other dissatisfied class
members to argue for future exceptions until the general rule disappears, at which
point the problems and interests that led the legislature to create class actions and
settlements will resurface.
The Second Circuit's decision in Stephenson seriously impairs the class action
device and inhibits settlement. It defeats the interest in encouraging settlement of
class actions because plaintiffs can sue again later. The decision works an injustice
on Dow and future defendants, who cannot settle with complete confidence that the
settlement is final because they face the possibility of numerous collateral attacks.
These consequences have crucial implications on the fundamental purposes of res
judicata and finality, class actions and settlements, and judicial efficiency.
Ironically, defendants assume all the risk and yet find themselves placed in a
position where they cannot possibly "win." For defendants, it is a "catch 22": if
they settle, it may not be final, and if they do not settle, they risk huge verdicts for
the plaintiffs. Hopefully, the United States Supreme Court will revisit this issue and
set a definitive precedent.
SaraMaurer

129. Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1991).
130. Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553 (3d Cir. 1994).
131. No. 25764, 2003 WL 23147500, at *1 I (S.C. Jan. 12, 2004).
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